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Surge Pricing on a Service Platform under Spatial Spillovers:
Evidence from Uber
Abstract
Ride-sharing platforms employ surge pricing to match anticipated capacity spillover with
demand. We develop an optimization model to characterize the relationship between surge
price and spillover. We test predicted relationships using a spatial panel model on a dataset
from Ubers operation. Results reveal that Ubers pricing accounts for both capacity and price
spillover. There is a debate in the management community on the ecacy of labor welfare
mechanisms associated with shared capacity. We conduct counterfactual analysis to provide
guidance in regards to the debate, for managing congestion, while accounting for consumer
and labor welfare through this online platform.
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Surge Pricing on a Service Platform under Spatial Spillovers:
Evidence from Uber
INTRODUCTION
The sharing economy has altered the way that firms, service providers, and consumers man-
age their time, money, and resources in a variety of industries ranging from transportation
to hospitality (Sundararajan 2016). The use of digital platforms in these settings enables
an on-demand service experience for consumers and expedient feedback to service providers.
Emergent literature has modeled both the operational aspects that drive stakeholder (firm,
provider, and consumer) decisions and the economic ramifications of such decisions (e.g., Co-
hen et al. 2016, Taylor 2018, Bai et al. 2018). Ride-sharing has received particular attention
in this realm (Gurvich et al. 2016, Cachon et al. 2017). Ride-sharing platforms such as Uber,
Lyft, Juno, Curb, Gett, Didi Chuxing, and Fasten connect individuals seeking a ride with
providers (drivers) who provide a service for a predetermined wage payment. In this setting,
drivers are sensitive not only to their wage rates but also to the variation in rider demand.
In a given period of time, the platform influences the ultimate demand and available drivers
it receives by setting prices. And, since drivers are allowed to dictate their own schedule, the
platform’s capacity is characterized by the mismatch that must account for variability both
in demand and supply. To deal with this mismatch, platforms often incorporate dynamic
pricing policies such as surge pricing to increase capacity and decrease demand in a con-
gested area. Prior research on ride-sharing has advanced our understanding of surge pricing
as a mechanism to help firms that operate platforms balance capacity and demand. Much
of this revenue management literature is analytic. Specific analytic assumptions have lead
to results that feature competing findings. According to Benjaafar et al. (2018, p.6):
“In settings where workers have discretion over how much they work, there has
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been some debate regarding the elasticity of labor supply. For example, in a study
of New Yorker City taxi drivers, Camerer et al. (1997) find evidence of negative
elasticity and argue that this may be due to taxi drivers being income targeters
(i.e., drivers tend to stop working once they reach an income target). In contrast,
Chen and Sheldon (2015) and Sheldon (2016), using data from the ride-sharing
service Uber, find that drivers tend to drive more when earnings are higher (e.g.,
during price surges).”
The debate about elasticity of labor supply has relied heavily on spot pricing. There is a
gap in the underlying literature, in terms of accounting for labor capacity spillovers and price
spillovers that transpire from one ride-sharing service zone to another. Capacity spillover
refers to the movement of drivers from one zone to another zone, either to fill an existing
demand (e.g., to pick up or drop off existing passengers) or in anticipation of future demand
(e.g., to seek riders in surging zones). Price spillover refers to the smoothing or balancing
of prices from a focal zone to its neighboring zone. Spot pricing, in contrast, refers to the
surging of prices solely in a focal zone. Most of the analytic work, for reasons of tractability,
uses spot pricing and ignores capacity spillovers. We help fill this gap in the empirical
revenue management literature by incorporating capacity spillovers and price smoothing
effects into our model via a spatial econometric specification. In contrast to some research
in this domain, we treat demand as endogenous to price changes, and we model capacity
as a dynamic construct while we investigate a ride-sharing platforms pricing strategy. Our
study addresses two questions: Under what conditions of price elasticity does a ride-sharing
platform set a particular level of surge pricing to deal with spatial spillovers so as to provide
reliable services (i.e., to reduce congestion expressed by customer waiting time)? And, how
effective are such spillover-based pricing policies in managing congestion and the welfare of
both the consumer and ride-sharing drivers (labor) in the presence of spillovers?
We start with a stylized capacity management model and find an equilibrium price that
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is driven by the current state of both capacity and demand. We then specify a spatial
econometric model that accounts for both the spatial and temporal effects on price. Using
this model, we estimate the pricing decision in the focal zone in terms of various forms of
capacity and pricing in the focal zone and its adjacent zones. We then use the estimated
parameters to conduct a counterfactual analysis in order to provide guidance in regards to
the debate, and to manage congestion, while assessing consumer and driver (labor) welfare.
Our paper contributes to the emergent literature on platform driven revenue manage-
ment in three unique ways: (i) We contribute to the literature on autonomous capacity
management, under two-sided network effects, by showing that depending upon conditions
of price elasticity, a ride-sharing platform can improve upon analytic (e.g., spot pricing)
results in the operations and information systems literature in terms of managing conges-
tion and welfare of shared capacity systems; (ii) We find that both capacity spillover and
price smoothing across zones have a significant association with surge pricing in the focal
zone; this finding advances empirical literature on revenue management that treats dynamic
pricing and congestion management as means to pool, whereas we also consider the case of
congestion due to pooling; (iii) We find that Uber’s algorithms update surge prices much
more rapidly than the speed of sampling of these data by the Uber drivers and consumers;
given this observation and our policy analysis results, we argue that the platform’s rapid
pricing updating enables Uber to achieve high performance, akin to aggressive pricing, when
compared with the spot pricing policies.
LITERATURE REVIEW
We draw upon two related literature streams: the empirical studies of revenue management
practices and the analytic treatment of allied welfare economics.
Our paper relates to the stream of empirical literature on revenue management that
combines capacity management with pricing strategies. We organize this literature into
the dimensions of either static versus dynamic (i.e., endogenous) capacity and static versus
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dynamic (endogenous) demand.
<Insert Table 1 about here>
The literature on static demand and capacity is abundant. A benchmark paper, Olivares
and Cachon (2009), draws upon a data set from the automotive industry to estimate the
effect of the number and type of local competitors on inventory holdings. Their results
suggest that the service-level effect is strong, nonlinear, and positive in that automobile
dealers carry more inventory (controlling for sales) when they face additional competition.
More recent work in this static-static stream focuses on pricing mechanisms in on-demand
service platforms to help balance capacity and demand. Li et al. (2016) use the context of on-
demand service platforms to estimate the effect of behavioral anomalies between amateur and
professional service providers on market outcomes. They empirically show that professional
providers experience higher occupancy rates and revenues using data from Airbnb. They
also propose a parsimonious model that suggests an incentive for Airbnb’s service platform
to charge different prices to amateur and professional service providers. In a similar setting
using a dataset from Airbnb, Cui and Hu (2018) consider distributed pricing instead of
centralized pricing while studying service provider behavior. Their work focuses on mutual
benefits of social utility for providers and customers. Given the setup, capacity and price
spillovers are not relevant to their work. Moreno and Terwiesch (2015) consider dynamic
(endogenous) capacity in a two-sided market setting by matching tasks with service providers.
They empirically examine independent contractors’ bidding behavior on freelance contractor
platforms, allowing for flexibility in production and dynamic pricing over time. Karacaoglu
et al. (2017) use data from a large e-hailing company in South America to study reactions
of drivers to entry of new competitors in their zone. Just like our paper, they also find
that agents are likely to scatter owing to increased capacity. However, they do not examine
pricing effects explicitly.
Li et al. (2014) relax the assumption of exogenous demand and instead model demand
as endogenous to price. They use airfare and booking data from the air-travel industry to
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conduct a structural estimation of the proportion of strategic consumers in the population.
They identify conditions under which most strategic consumers are found and when such
consumers’ presence may boost revenues. Lu et al. (2013) develop an econometric framework
in a retail context that uses queuing activity along with point-of-sales (POS) information
to estimate the impact of queues on consumer behavior, showing that a pooled system can
lead to fewer customers joining the system and therefore increase lost sales when customers
decide to join a queue based on its queue length. As in Li et al. (2014), they also set demand
as endogenous to price and find an indirect cross-elasticity effect, in that lowering the price of
one product can increase congestion, which can indirectly affect demand for another product.
This effect is magnified by the heterogeneity and the negative relationship between customer
waiting and price sensitivity of the customer. Tereyag˘og˘lu et al. (2018) adopt a dynamic
pricing model in a concert ticket sales setting to examine consumer purchasing behavior that
is dependent on price and capacity sold. They empirically show that the effect of referencing
to past experiences is strong and that consumers are loss averse across price and number of
seats sold as a fraction of capacity during their past visits. These studies consider service
capacity as fixed, whereas our model considers both service capacity and demand as dynamic
constructs.
On the analytic side, recent literature in this stream has also examined congestion and
welfare implications for pricing and capacity decisions in on-demand service platforms. A
bulk of this literature focuses on spot pricing for reasons of tractability (i.e., it considers
price surges solely in a focal zone). Cachon et al. (2017) and Taylor (2018) consider agent
participation (i.e., the decision of whether to join the platform) under stochastic demand and
agent opportunity costs, and they treat price and wage as endogenous. Cachon et al. (2017)
presents an analytic model with dynamic prices and wages under self-scheduling capacity
(independent agents), while Taylor (2018) considers platforms that commit to prices and
wages in advance; they study the effect of agent independence and customer-delay sensitivity
on the optimal price and wage. As an exception to spot pricing work, some studies have
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gone on to examine information spillovers from consumer learning about the quality of a
service from past experiences (Musalem et al. 2017) or they explore provider capacity when
one service zone spills over to another service zone to meet unfilled demand. Bimpikis
et al. (2016) identify possible spillovers by considering ride-sharing platforms that price
discriminate based on location to study the network effect of service demand patterns on
the platform’s pricing policy, profits, and consumer surplus under a stationary environment.
However, such models overlook welfare economics. Since the spot pricing dominates a bulk
of the literature on welfare economics, we use spot pricing as a benchmark for comparisons
in our counterfactual analysis.
SURGE PRICING WITH SPATIAL SPILLOVERS
Surge Pricing Model
Drivers in a ride-sharing platform are allowed to autonomously decide whether to drive in a
particular zone, and this autonomy leads to variation in capacity levels over time. In order
to match demand with the variable capacity over time, the platform conducts a dynamic
pricing policy (or a dynamic wage policy) that considers both the current level of capacity and
expected demand. For example, a platform sets a higher price (and thus a higher wage) when
facing lower capacity levels during a high demand period to increase capacity and decrease
unmet demand. In the Uber platform, this price variation is set by a surge multiplier, a
multiplicative factor offsetting the standard trip fare that is based on distance and time.
Throughout this paper, price denotes the surge multiplier since we focus on the dynamic
portion of price response to capacity and demand in a zone regardless of trip distance and
time. We also assume the driver receives a commission that is proportional to the price.
In addition, the platform deals with spatially distributed capacity since a driver moves
from one zone to another for various reasons. A driver’s participation decision may be
positively (Chen and Sheldon 2015) or negatively (Camerer et al. 1997) linked with price.
For example, an idle driver may choose to switch zones based on expectation of earnings in
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a surging price zone, while an occupied driver may move to another zone while navigating to
the current rider’s destination. Therefore, capacity levels for the subsequent period depend
on capacity spillovers from idle drivers’ movements as well as drivers who relocate to new
zones due to rider destinations. In this section, we formulate how price encapsulates such
capacity spillovers. The degree of spatial price discrimination is determined by how a single
zone is defined. As an extreme, a single zone could possibly aggregate all the drivers so
that no actual spatial discrimination exists. However, Bimpikis et al. (2016) argues that
some degree of spatial discrimination is more beneficial than non-discriminated pricing. In
addition, Chen et al. (2015) found that Uber predetermines zones where each driver receives
an identical price. We assume that the entire ride-sharing service area is divided into multiple
zones and that a distinct price is periodically assigned to each zone.
<Insert Table 2 about here>
Price in each zone is determined by the price-dependent demand di,t and capacity levels.
Demand di,t is characterized by two factors: a price-dependent factor and an exogenous
demand state. Throughout our study, we assume a linear demand to capture both factors.
Consistent with Uber’s demand estimation approach, we set up the aggregate demand in
zone i at time t to be:
di,t = −αsi,t + θi,t + error (1)
Within this setup, two capacity effects are key factors in determining price: the direct
effect and spillover effect. First, the capacity in the focal zone i for the current time period
t, denoted by FCi,t, has first-order effects on the price. The factors di,t and FCi,t help
characterize the system’s operational performance (e.g., capacity shortage and utilization),
especially for ride demand from consumers sensitive to wait-time. Once current demand
is served by FCi,t, the remaining drivers in the focal zone decide whether to stay in the
zone based on their opportunity costs, which we assume to be randomly distributed. A
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driver will stay only if expected earnings exceed the opportunity costs (Cachon et al. 2017).
Therefore, assuming the distribution is known with its cumulative density function OCFC ,
the probability of a driver staying in the same zone PFC is identical to OCFC(Expected
Earnings), which is a function of price under the commission-based wage scheme. Second,
capacity spillovers are also related to price in the focal zone. We characterize two types
of price-related capacity spillovers. One is from the spillover of drivers from neighboring
zones and the other is from untapped drivers − those not currently driving − who choose to
operate in the focal zone because of high expected earnings. Similar to drivers currently in
the focal zone, drivers in neighboring zones at time t, denoted by NCi,t and registered drivers
not currently in operation at time t, denoted by UCt, may choose to participate in the focal
zone with probabilities PNC and PUC , respectively. These probabilities differ since each of
the three capacity types has a distinct distribution of opportunity costs which take earnings
from any other alternatives into account. In short, these three forms of capacity (i.e., FCi,t,
NCi,t, UCt) determine the focal capacity in the subsequent period with different probabilities
that are directly proportional to the price. Thus, the focal zone capacity is updated by the
specified spillovers with price-dependent probabilities as well as spillovers that arise due to
customer destinations ending in zone i. Formally, the updated focal capacity of zone i for
time t+ 1 satisfies:
FCi,t+1 =
∑
j 6=i
bji ·min(dj,t, FCj,t) + bii ·min(di,t, FCi,t)
+max(FCi,t − di,t, 0)PFC(si,t) +NCi,tPNC(si,t) + UCtPUC(si,t) (2)
In Equation (2), the first term on the right indicates drivers entering the focal zone from
all other zones, the second term on the right indicates drivers who serve demand within the
focal zone, and the last three terms indicate drivers who choose to be in the focal zone based
on each price-dependent probability (PFC , PNC , PUC). A summary of all variables is shown
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in Table 2. To characterize the relationship between price and each of the three capacity
types, we assume that the opportunity costs for each capacity type are uniformly distributed
with distinct ranges, so that the participation probabilities are linearly proportional to the
price with different rates. That is, for l ∈ {FC,NC,UC},
Pl = γlsi,t + δl (3)
Consumers in the platform are sensitive to waiting time when they have available alter-
natives. In response, a ride-sharing platform may set a price that minimizes its capacity
shortage since the shortage penalizes the platform through a loss of consumers. Moreover,
the platform also needs to consider the number of focal drivers in the subsequent period.
Having excess drivers in the following period may increase driver competition, which, in
turn, reduces drivers’ expected earnings. In sum, a high price decreases demand for the cur-
rent period but increases capacity for the subsequent period. To capture such an temporal
trade-off, we model a two-period capacity problem with an equilibrium price set to minimize
the penalty costs from capacity shortage and the holding costs associated with the number
of drivers in the subsequent period. Formally, we present the following stylized objective
function for the platform’s capacity management:
minimize
si,t>1
E[p ·max(0, di,t − FCi,t) + h · FCi,t+1] (4)
With the demand given in Equation (1), the optimization problem characterizes an equi-
librium price of the platform as a function of each capacity type, when demand state θi,t is
greater than FCi,t. Formally, an equilibrium price is given by:
si,t =
p− hδFC
2hγFC
− 1
2α
FCi,t − γNC
2αγFC
NCi,t − γUC
2αγFC
UCt +
θi,t
2α
(5)
(see Appendix A for the proof)
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As a result, in addition to the zone-specific characteristics such as demand state and FC,
other external effects such as spillovers from NC and UC are also reflected in the equilibrium
price. The equilibrium price is thus based on the current state capacity and demand as well
as the price sensitivities of each capacity type (γFC , γNC , γUC) and demand (−α).
Price Sensitivity of Capacity Spillovers
By drawing upon the price sensitivity parameters from the preceding analysis, we build a set
of empirically testable hypotheses on the relationship between the current spatial distribution
of capacity and price. Neoclassical theory assumes that individuals maximize their own
utility. Such an assumption implies that demand is negatively related to an increase in
price (i.e., α > 0). Negative price sensitivity of demand has been empirically shown in the
context of transport (see Oum et al. (1992)). Furthermore, Cohen et al. (2016) find empirical
evidence of the negative price elasticity of demand in the ride-sharing context. Nevertheless,
a tension remains in regards to the price sensitivity of labor supply. On one hand, Camerer
et al. (1997) finds a negative relationship between price and labor hours of New York City
taxi drivers, suggesting reference-dependent behavior of drivers. In other words, they argue
that drivers tend to stop driving once they reach their desired daily profits. On the other
hand, Chen et al. (2015) and Chen and Sheldon (2015) show empirical support for a positive
link between price change and driver participation in the Uber platform. These findings are
consistent with a common assumption that expected earning must exceed the opportunity
costs for a ride-share driver’s participation (see e.g., Bai et al. (2018), Benjaafar et al. (2018),
Cachon et al. (2017), Gurvich et al. (2016), Ibrahim (2018), Taylor (2018), etc.).
Since prior studies featuring price sensitivity and labor supply have addressed temporal
changes, we too look at temporal factors and also focus on the spatial distribution of drivers
in the ride-sharing service area. That is, we are interested in two decisions of a driver: when
to start and stop work and relocation during their work. The relationship between the price
and relocation decision is measured by γFC and γNC . Therefore, we claim that these two
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sensitivities will have the same sign (i.e. γNC
γFC
> 0) as long as a driver exhibits consistent
behavior. Particularly, if a driver has already decided to work in the current period and
maximizes expected earnings for the relocation decision, this driver will move to a zone
with a higher price. This earning-maximizing behavior suggests that both γFC and γNC
are positive. On the other hand, γUC captures both the driver’s relocation and work hours
decision. If the earning-maximizing assumption applies for both decisions, we can conclude
that γUC is positive. However, if a driver’s decision to work a certain number of hours is
independent of the current price, then γUC only measures their relocation decision and the
sign may not be positive. However, if a driver’s decision to work a certain number of hours
is negatively associated with price, the sign of γUC will be mixed. Farber (2015) finds that
a driver’s hours of operation decision is generally positively related to price although it is
heterogeneous across drivers. In line with their findings, we also assume that γFC and γUC
have the same sign (i.e., γUC
γFC
> 0).
The sign of the price sensitivity parameters characterizes the relationship between price
and capacity type. First, under a positive γFC assumption, the price in the focal zone will
increase to manage capacity utilization (the consumer-to-driver ratio) when focal capacity is
congested (i.e., the platform attempts to maintain the focal capacity by providing relatively
high expected earnings). Furthermore, if the price sensitivity of consumers (−α) is negative,
the equilibrium price will indicate that the platform may set a higher price for a low current
focal capacity to match demand with the given capacity by decreasing demand. Second,
the current neighbor capacity level is negatively correlated with price. In other words, price
will not increase if an adequate number of drivers are in neighboring zones but too few
drivers are in the focal zone. Likewise, price will increase when few drivers are in neighbor
zones even though the focal capacity was high enough to meet the current demand. The
equilibrium price also indicates a negative relationship between price in the focal zone and
NC under the assumptions that α > 0 and γNC
γFC
> 0. Finally, we characterize an inverse
relationship between the price and UC. When the number of drivers who are expected to
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potentially participate in the following period is high, the price in the focal zone will increase
to reduce the possibility of driver shortage. The equilibrium price also suggests the negative
relationship under α > 0 and γNC
γFC
> 0. Therefore, we present a set of hypotheses on the
relationship between price and each of the three types of capacity as follows:
Hypothesis 1. The price in each zone is negatively associated with the number of
current drivers in the same zone.
Hypothesis 2. The price in each zone is negatively associated with the number of
current drivers in its neighboring zones.
Hypothesis 3. The price in each zone is negatively associated with the number of
current untapped drivers.
Price Smoothing
So far, we have assumed that the surge multiplier for a certain zone is independent of pricing
characteristics in other zones. However, there may be a set of absolute spatial spillover effects
on the price across zones. That is, a price change in the focal zone may directly relate to
price changes neighboring zones. In the study of the real estate market, Can (1992) found
that housing prices are dependent on nearby prices solely based on their spatial proximity.
This suggests that there exists a spatial dependency that translates to neighboring prices.
In the ride-sharing context, a pricing policy in the focal zone may capitalize on the spatial
proximity of neighboring zones since it directly relates to consumer wait-time. In other
words, when a focal zone is highly likely to experience a capacity shortage, the platform may
increase prices not only in the focal zone but also in neighboring zones regardless of their
capacity and demand levels. In this scenario, a driver outside the focal zone travels into the
focal zone only when expected earnings exceed the opportunity costs, which account for the
spatial proximity to the focal zone. Thus, the probability of participating in the focal zone
decreases with distance from that zone. Therefore, when there is a capacity shortage, the
price may not only go up in the congested zone but also gradually rise in neighbor zones
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around the congested zone, in order to secure drivers nearby. We define such a mechanism
as price smoothing. Price smoothing can reduce further shortages by attracting drivers into
locations in which their participation probabilities increase. In addition, price smoothing
can prevent high degrees of price discrimination across zones, which can cause inefficiencies
by allowing strategic behavior from drivers and riders. In turn, we hypothesize that the
surge price in a focal zone also increases prices in neighboring zones:
Hypothesis 4. The price in each zone is positively associated with the prices in its
neighboring zones.
Figure 1 offers a conceptual depiction of the hypothesized internal and external factors
that affect price.
<Insert Figure 1 about here>
DATA AND METHODS
Data Collection and Measures
We collected data on UberX activity to test our hypotheses using the methods developed by
Chen et al. (2015) and also adopted by Jiang et al. (2018). UberX is the most popular ride-
sharing service in the United States. Although Uber provides various versions of ride-sharing
platforms such as UberBlack and UberPool, we focus on UberX since it provides a simple
one-to-one service and allows for the most autonomy for driver participation and spatial
relocation among all Uber-based platforms. We recorded the responses of Uber’s server in
the passenger app. When a consumer sends a signal for a ride request in the passenger
app, Uber’s server responds every five seconds with the GPS coordinates of the eight nearest
available drivers and the current surge multiplier (i.e., price). We developed a script that
sends signals to the Uber server from multiple observation points simultaneously and records
each of the responses. We collected the data in San Francisco from 00:00 A.M on November
12, 2016 to 11:59 P.M on November 30, 2016. Aggregate descriptions of the sample along
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with descriptive statistics are shown in Appendix B.
Our unit of analysis is the surge zone, in which a single price is given for each vehicle at
each point in time. Consistent with Jiang et al. (2018), we use the block group to denote
a surge zone. Although variation within the block group is possible, the block group is the
most granular unit that is amenable to analysis. Hence we aggregated the collected data
into capacity and price levels for block groups. In addition, based on the data shown in
Appendix B, we observe that the average travel time from one zone to another zone is about
30 minutes. Therefore, we constructed a panel data set of the average price (si,t) and number
of unique drivers (FCi,t) for each zone (i) in each 30-minute interval (t) - robustness checks
are presented in Appendix C.
The other explanatory variables are operationalized from FCi,t with a few assumptions.
First, to measure UCt, we assume a large fixed value as the total number of registered
Uber drivers (M) in San Francisco. Thus, we have UCt = M −
∑
i FCi,t. Second, when
calculating NCi,t, we multiply FCi,t by a spatial weight matrix W . For N zones, the spatial
weight matrix is an N × N nonnegative matrix of which elements (wij) indicate spatial
proximity between any two zones (i and j). Its diagonal elements are zero and the matrix
is row-normalized. We adopt the radial distance method (Cliff and Ord 1981, Anselin 1988)
for our analysis: wij =

1, if 0 < Distij ≤ 2
0, otherwise
, where Distij is the distance between i and j.
By assembling NCi,t with W , we were able to incorporate our assumption that opportunity
costs increase with distance from the focal zone. Furthermore, this enables us to use a spatial
Durbin model, as discussed in the following section.
Estimation Strategy
To begin, we consider a regression model specification with both spatial and temporal effects
of the following form:
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yi,t = βxi,t + µi + t+ i,t (6)
where each subscript i refers to the zone and t the time, yi,t represents an observation of
the dependent variable, β is a fixed parameter, xi,t is an observation of each explanatory
variable, µi represents the spatial fixed effect, t represents the vector for temporal effects
that control for the time trend, and i,t an independently and identically distributed error
term with zero mean. The inclusion of µi and t should help capture omitted time-invariant
factors that characterize each zone and omitted temporal factors, respectively.
In addition to the spatial and time specific effects, our model further accounts for the
following interaction effects: (i) pricing decisions in a focal zone that may be influenced
by an explanatory variable in nearby zones, (ii) pricing decisions in other zones that may
influence pricing decisions in the focal zone, and (iii) pricing decisions in different zones that
may be spatially correlated due to unobserved characteristics. To account for such possible
interactions among different zones, we develop a spatial panel regression model by extending
Equation (6) as follows:
yi,t = λ
N∑
j=1
wijyj,t + βxi,t + β
′
N∑
j=1
wijxi,t + µi + t+ υi,t (7)
where
υi,t = ρ
N∑
j=1
wijυj,t + i,t (8)
where υi,t represents a spatially autocorrelated model and ρ is the spatial autocorrelation
coefficient.
The inclusion of a spatially lagged dependent variable term (λ
∑N
j=1wijyj,t) and a spa-
tially lagged explanatory variable (β′
∑N
j=1wijxi,t) account for the spatial interaction effects
(i) and (ii), respectively, where λ is the spatial autoregressive coefficient and β′ is a fixed but
unknown parameter. The spatial econometrics literature refers to the model that includes
these two effects as the “spatial Durbin model” (SDM), see Anselin (1988) and LeSage and
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Pace (2009). Moreover, specifying the error term as in equation (8) helps us incorporate the
third spatial interaction effect (iii). The literature denotes it as a Manski model, when all
three effects are jointly included (Elhorst 2010). However, separately identifying each effect
is impossible (Bottasso et al. 2014). Instead, LeSage and Pace (2009) suggest that ignoring
the spatial error dependence only reduces efficiency in the estimates, which can be mitigated
with a large sample such as ours. Moreover, the authors indicate that the SDM model does
not ignore spatial dependence in the disturbances but nests models involving both (i) and
(iii). Therefore, LeSage and Pace (2009) argue that the SDM model generates unbiased
coefficient estimates even if the true process includes interaction effects (iii). Bottasso et al.
(2014) further discuss how unbiased estimates of the SDM model can be obtained even with
the possibility of error dependence.
Given these considerations, we use a spatial Durbin specification to estimate our model
as follows:
si,t = λ
N∑
j=1
wijsj,t + β1FCi,t + β2NCi,t + β3UCt + µi + t+ i,t (9)
where s.,t represents the average surge multiplier in zone · for period t, NCi,t =
∑N
j=1wijFCj,t,
β1 represents the degree that price is dependent on focal capacity at a given level of demand,
and β2 and β3 reflect how much each capacity spillover is factored into the price. λ indicates
the extent to which price is affected by spatial proximity. We ran joint Lagrange multiplier
(LM) tests that were derived by Baltagi et al. (2003) (i.e., extended LM tests of Breusch
and Pagan (1980)) to test for the random effects and spatial error dependence for our model
specification. In addition to the main explanatory variables, Chen and Sheldon (2015) found
evidence of variation in demand by weather and weekend. Hence, we included t to control
for temporal effects such as Weathert, which is 1 if it is rainy and zero otherwise, which
controls for the natural variation in demand state due to adverse weather conditions. We
also controlled for weekend (Weekendt), and time of day (Hourt) effects, which determine
the demand states θi,t for a given time period; Weekendt is equal to one if the observation
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was made during the weekend and zero otherwise. This controls for variations in demand
state by day of the week; Hourt simply controls for time-of-day effects. Moreover, demand
states may also vary with zone. For example, downtown San Francisco, a densely populated
commercial area, has a different demand pattern from that of the Sunset District, which is
a residential area. We control for any such variations across zones by including the time-
invariant spatial effects µi. We ran a Hausman test to check whether our model estimates
are consistent with a random effects estimation, guided by Mutl and Pfaffermayr (2011).
The test statistics indicate that including random effects is inconsistent, thus we consider
the fixed effects for our main analysis. In particular, we use the maximum likelihood spatial
fixed effects estimator proposed by Lee and Yu (2010), who suggest this as a bias correction
procedure for previous maximum likelihood estimators. By adding both temporal factors t
and spatial fixed effects µi, our estimation procedure controls the exogenous demand state
(θi,t) that is presented in the equilibrium price. For the estimation process, We follow the
xsmle routine for STATA proposed by Belotti et al. (2016).
Estimation Results
The first column of Table 3 summarizes the estimation results of Equation (9). We find that
the coefficient estimate (β1) for the Focal Capacity (FC) is not statistically significant. Thus,
Hypothesis 1 is not supported. In other words, the price does not appear to incorporate
the number of drivers in the focal zone. This is possibly because the current FC is not
independently utilized by itself but integrated with the demand state as a signal to surge.
The price may surge when the demand state is expected to exceed the current FC. However,
the degree of the price surge may not be dependent on those two factors. Moreover, a
driver currently transporting a consumer may pass through other zones quickly to reach the
destination. Thus, the pricing does not assume that drivers will stay idle within the same
zone in the subsequent time period. Instead, we observe that the median of driver’s idle time
is only about 3 minutes. The positive sign of β1 indicates that price may increase with higher
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FC although it is not statistically significant. This could be explained by driver’s forward-
looking behavior. That is, a driver may decide where to go based on future price rather
than current price. Yılmaz et al. (2017) found that the positive effects of dynamic pricing
diminishes with such strategic behavior. To enhance the effectiveness of surge pricing, Uber
can discourage driver’s strategic behavior. By increasing the price slightly with an additional
driver in the focal zone, the focal drivers are encouraged to stay in the zone.
<Insert Table 3 about here>
Hypothesis 2 posits that the price in a focal zone will increase if not enough drivers
are close to the zone. We find support for Hypothesis 2 by observing that the number of
active drivers in neighboring zones has a significantly negative impact on price. The negative
relationship provides two important insights into Uber’s pricing policy. One is that Uber
assumes a positive price sensitivity for Neighboring Capacity (NC) spillovers. The pricing
policy expects neighboring-zone drivers will be stimulated to cross into the focal zone that
offers an increased price. The second insight is that Uber assumes that unmet demand in
the focal zone can be served by the spilled-over NC. That is, the pricing policy proactively
capitalizes on the anticipated NC spillovers. We also observe that the magnitude of the NC’s
impact is greater than that of the FC’s. This suggests that Uber attempts to efficiently
address demand in the focal zone by serving relatively less delay-sensitive consumers at a
lower price while giving up on serving consumers who are highly sensitive to delay. In other
words, as long as consumers are tolerable enough to be served by NC, they can be served at
a lower price. On the contrary, if they are highly sensitive to demand, Uber would choose to
serve them with higher price. This aligns with the argument of Taylor (2018) that consumers
with high delay sensitivity have prompted the platform to raise prices while giving up on
serving price-sensitive consumers.
Furthermore, we find that the impact of Untapped Capacity (UC) on price is negative, in
line with Hypothesis 3. In other words, an increase in total number of registered Uber drivers
across all zones is associated with an increase in price. This illustrates that Uber provides
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more incentives to currently operating drivers in any zone than to untapped drivers. An
untapped driver may not participate in the focal zone only because of its high price. Thus,
Uber may facilitate the matching of demand with supply by utilizing existing drivers rather
than by attracting untapped drivers. This finding contrasts with a common argument that
the untapped driver’s participation is motivated by the increased price. Rather, this suggests
that working hours of a driver tend to be set ex ante regardless of price level as assumed in
Bimpikis et al. (2016).
In our estimation, β2 and β3 estimate
γNC
2αγFC
and γUC
2αγFC
respectively, and the ratios are
sensitive to the value of α. In other words, despite the statistical significance, the impact of
FC and UC on price can be small if consumers are highly sensitive to price. Nonetheless, to
further investigate the effects of FC and UC under specific pricing policies, we study outcome
performance with different values of α in the counterfactual analysis.
We next examine the impact of spatially lagged variable
∑N
j=1wijsj,t to assess whether
Uber accounts for price smoothing. We find that the focal price is strongly dependent
on the prices in the neighboring zones, supporting Hypothesis 4. This indicates that, in
addition to exogenous factors such as capacity levels and demand state, price in the focal
zone is endogenously affected by itself due to its interrelationship with prices in the neighbor
zones. That is, spatial proximity is another significant factor that determines the spatial
distribution of prices. For example, even when a price in the focal zone needs to surge based
on exogenous factors while prices in neighboring zones do not, Uber increases prices not
only in the focal zone but also in neighbor zones. Uber executes price smoothing for two
possible reasons. First, it encourages drivers to move or stay near the shortage zone by
simultaneously increasing prices in a cluster of zones. By attracting drivers with high prices,
Uber can aggressively react to a capacity shortage. Second, by invoking price smoothing,
Uber prevents consumers in the focal zone from reneging or moving toward a neighboring
zone. In turn, price smoothing allows consumers to trade-off high price for a certain level of
delay. In sum, we find that Uber manages the spatial dimension of capacity with a pricing
20
policy that capitalizes on two spatial spillovers: capacity spillovers and price smoothing.
Robustness Checks
Time agglomeration.
As per our raw data set, Uber updates its states every 5 seconds. However, as shown in
Appendix B, the average time that drivers require to learn about the system status, based
on their average travel time, is several minutes. We have tested the model by aggregating
the data set at 15 and 60 minute intervals as shown in Appendix C.1. These results are
structurally similar to the base case shown in Table 3.
Specification of spatial weight matrix (W).
We use the radial distance method to specify the W matrix while smoothing prices in our
base case (i.e, the result in Table 3). We also checked for the robustness of our results with
different W s. Two other widely-used methods were employed as suggested in Cliff and Ord
(1981) and Anselin (1988): the K-nearest and distance decay methods. In the K-nearest
method, wij =

1, if j ∈ N40(i)
0, otherwise
, where N40(i) is a set of 40 nearest zones of zone i. In the
distance decay method, wij = 1/Distij, where Distij refers to the distance between i and j.
The base case results remain robust as shown in Appendix C.2.
Endogeneity.
So far, we have assumed that price decisions for a given period are made after the level of
focal capacity is observed for that period. That is, the focal capacity might be considered
exogenous after controlling for spatial and temporal effects. However, this assumption may
not be warranted for a few reasons. For example, an increase in focal capacity for a given
period might have resulted from a price increase in the zone for that period. Such simul-
taneity can bias the coefficient estimates. Although appropriate instrument variables (IVs)
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would help us to address the issue, such methods with a spatial panel dataset are not well
developed in the spatial econometrics literature. Instead, we address the issue in a similar
fashion to Bottasso et al. (2014). First, we obtained estimates using lagged explanatory
variables (FCi,t−1, NCi,t−1, UCt−1) in order to account for the difference in time. In this
way, endogeneity bias from the current price that could trigger changes in the current focal
capacity is likely to be a minor issue. As shown in Table 3, column 2, our results are robust
in that NC and UC have a negative impact on price while the impact of FC is insignificant.
Secondly, following by Bottasso et al. (2014), we also implemented temporal lags of FCi,t
and NCi,t as IVs using a generalized method of moments (GMM) approach. In order for an
IV to be valid, it must be correlated with the explanatory variables, FCi,t and NCi,t in our
case, and can influence the dependent variable si,t only through the explanatory variables.
Since driver movements can be costly when the driver is idle, the total focal capacity might
be correlated over time. Chen and Sheldon (2015) found that the median driving time of
Uber drivers was 3.47 hours, which suggests that the number of drivers are correlated within
the time interval. Furthermore, the number of drivers is expected to have a certain degree
of temporal autocorrelation due to our data aggregation process. However, all lags are not
exogenous due to the data aggregation. Among those that satisfy the first condition, the
furthest lag could have the least direct impact on the price. Using our data, we find that
FCi,t−8 and NCi,t−8 are not significantly correlated with si,t but correlated with FCi,t and
NCi,t. Therefore, we use FCi,t−8 and NCi,t−8 as our IVs for the GMM approach. As shown
in Appendix C.3, empirical results indicate that both price and capacity spillovers are im-
portant factors in the pricing decision, suggesting that we have mitigated concerns of this
type of endogeneity.
Demand Sensitivity.
The coefficients estimated in Table 3 imply relationships among price sensitivities of con-
sumer and labor as suggested in the equilibrium price. We did not have data on demand
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state θi,t. Our regression results may be affected by variation in θi,t. Therefore, we check
robustness of the findings by examining the sensitivity of our results to a range of demand
levels. The results are presented in Appendix D. These results show that the findings
reported in the following section are robust to choice of level of θi,t.
COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS
To study the role of spatial surge pricing in addressing congestion and welfare in a ride-
sharing platform, we constructed three alternative pricing policies, each featuring estimated
parameters, and then we compared their respective performance. Recall that our price
elasticity measure is α/θi,t. Since both these parameters can vary independent of each other,
in our simulation, we either fix α (price sensitivity of demand) or θi,t (level of demand) and
vary the other parameter in a systematic manner.
The first policy (Case 1 ) is a regular spot-surge pricing strategy that disregards both
capacity spillovers and price smoothing: si,t =
θi,t−FC
2α
+ 0.89; that is, price changes solely
based on the demand states (θi,t) and FCi,t. The other variables such as NCi,t, UCt, and W
do not affect the price decision. This spot pricing approach is consistent with the analytic
literature (Bai et al. 2018, Cachon et al. 2017, Gurvich et al. 2016). The second policy (Case
2 ) mimics Uber’s existing spatial surge pricing that accounts for both capacity spillovers
and price smoothing: si,t =
θi,t−FC
2α
+ 0.89
∑N
j=1wijsj,t − 0.000496NCi,t − 0.00000189UCt.
That is, by using the estimated coefficients (see Table 3), the focal price depends upon
NC , UC and the neighboring zone prices. The third policy (Case 3 ) we propose is a
surge pricing scheme that considers only price smoothing and ignores capacity spillovers:
si,t =
θi,t−FC
2α
+ 0.89
∑N
j=1wijsj,t. Since prices become less elastic to a capacity shortage by
considering the anticipated spillovers, Case 3 is the most aggressive pricing policy for reacting
to a capacity shortage. We propose Case 3 and compare it with the other two cases since
it may be a good candidate for a platform like Uber, aimed to provide reliable services. By
comparing these policies, we examine the effects of price smoothing and capacity spillovers
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on both driver (labor) and consumer welfare.
As mentioned earlier, a ride-sharing platform’s pricing policy aims not only to maximize
profits but also to increase its market share. To increase its market share, the platform must
provide a sufficient number of drivers to quickly serve consumers and it must simultaneously
provide sufficient expected earnings for drivers. Consumers may be highly sensitive to delay
or price because their cost to switch to another option is relatively low. Therefore, among
other factors, utilization ratio (demand-to-supply ratio) and capacity shortage are critical
performance metrics for the platform. In addition to utilization and capacity shortage, we
also compare Uber’s consumer surplus and driver surplus under the three pricing policies.
As the platform utilizes autonomous drivers, the platform’s pricing policy will affect both
the consumer and the driver (labor). Furthermore, the surplus of one side will also affect
participants on both sides. For example, an additional rider who joins due to high surplus
may attract an additional driver by increasing expected earnings. This two-sided network
effect is required for the platform’s sustainable growth (Parker and Van Alstyne (2005)).
In addition, regulators are also interested in these performance metrics as this industry is
growing. In many cities, Uber is now required to limit the daily hours that drivers can work
to protect their welfare. Therefore, it is also useful to document the surpluses for a variety
of pricing policies.
To compare these policies, we set up a virtual space that consists of 25 identical zones
(5×5). In each zone, demands occur randomly based on price, demand state (θi,t), and
exogenous consumer price sensitivity (α). Although the demand state θi,t should differ across
zone and time, we keep it constant (θi,t =100) for the sake of comparison with α throughout
our main analysis. Performance comparisons with different θi,t are shown in Appendix D.
FCi,t is initially exogenous but can change based on the price sensitivity of each capacity
inferred from our estimation. We ran the simulation 100 times with each pricing policy, and
calculated the performance for each run in each of the 25 zones.
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Capacity Shortage and Utilization
Figures 2a and 2b illustrate the operational performance of the three pricing policies where
the demand state is greater than current capacity. Overall, these plots clearly show the
trade-off between effectiveness (i.e., decreasing the average capacity shortage) and efficiency
(i.e., increasing the average capacity utilization). Such trade-offs are commonly seen in the
queuing literature (Ou and Wein 1992), but they have not been documented in settings
mediated by two-sided platforms. Due to these trade-offs, a platform’s pricing decision
depends on the weight assigned to effectiveness, instead of efficiency. For example, a platform
whose goal is to minimize capacity shortage performs better with Case 3 for consumers while
Case 1 is best for a platform primarily concerned with utilization. In addition, the pricing
decision also depends on consumer’s price sensitivity. Price sensitivity, along with wait-time
sensitivity form the consumer’s tolerance limit, which determines whether consumer demand
is fulfilled by existing drivers. As the price sensitivity increases, the consumer tolerance limit
decreases. The number of available drivers is the lowest in Case 2 when the limit is extremely
low (i.e., α > 92); our results are flipped when this limit increases (i.e., α ≤ 92).
We initially study the impact of price smoothing by comparing Case 1 (spot pricing)
and Case 3. We find that a platform increases its effectiveness (i.e., reducing shortage)
by conducting price smoothing. With spot pricing, the shortage increases with consumer’s
price sensitivity up to the point where no drivers are available. On the other hand, price
smoothing induces drivers to capture some of the highly price-sensitive consumer, and in
turn the shortage decreases. This is because price smoothing effectively incentivizes drivers
to gather near the congested zone so that wait-time in the next period is reduced to within
the limits. In turn, more demand may be served. Secondly, we find that as consumers get
more sensitive to price, Case 3 efficiently maintains low shortage without employing more
drivers. As the price sensitivity increases, price smoothing motivates existing drivers to
move closer to the limits of consumers, and thus utilization increases. However, without
price smoothing, utilization remains nearly stationary but the shortage decreases as price
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sensitivity increases, because consumers begin to leave due to lack of available drivers in
their tolerance limits.
<Insert Figure 2 about here>
We next observe the impact of capacity spillovers in price by comparing Cases 2 and 3.
Overall, we find that capturing anticipated capacity spillovers not only increases utilization
(high efficiency) but also increases shortage (low effectiveness). Case 2 is effective only when
consumers are tolerant enough to be served by driver from another zone. However, when
a platform faces a wait-time sensitive consumer, the demand can be served only by drivers
within the tolerance limit, preventing drivers’ chasing behavior. While this increases the
drivers’ probability of serving demand, the total number of matches may decrease due to
loss of demand from wait-time sensitive consumers. In addition, the gap between demand
and supply increases with the price sensitivity of consumers. Consumers could be strategic
and choose to wait for a low price as long as they can afford the wait. However, high
price sensitivity restricts this flexibility as price may not decrease to expected levels and
a consumer may be able to afford a longer wait. Such restricted flexibility makes it less
effective to utilize the expected capacity spillovers. Therefore, a platform that focuses only
on reducing shortage is worse off by incorporating anticipated capacity spillovers.
In summary, in terms of congestion, our results are conditioned upon the price elasticity
parameter. We show that (i) price smoothing increases the number of matches for most
consumers by allowing drivers to move toward the congested area, and (ii) capitalization
of anticipated capacity spillovers increases utilization by attempting to match demand with
near-limit drivers while increasing shortage. To understand how these effects affect both the
consumer and the driver side, we next analyze the surpluses of both sides in the following
section.
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Consumer Surplus and Labor Surplus
With a linear demand assumption (di,t = −α(si,t − 1) + θi,t + i,t), we calculate consumer
surplus (CS) in a similar method to Cachon et al. (2017) and Cohen et al. (2016): CS =∑
t
∑
i
1
2
· ( θi,t
α
+ 1 − si,t) ·min(di,t, FCi,t) In our case, the willingness-to-pay of a consumer
changes with her price sensitivity and the current demand state. For example, in a high
demand state such as adverse weather conditions, consumers are willing to take a service at
a higher price. Besides, consumer surplus increases with served demand and decreases with
prices. We also calculate labor surplus (LS) in a similar fashion to Cachon et al. (2017):
LS =
∑
t
∑
i si,t ·Prob(Serving) ·FCi,t. The expected earning by a single driver conditional
on joining is si,t · Prob(serving) where Prob(Serving) is 1 if si,t > 1 and 0.5 otherwise.
Next, we report on how consumer surplus changes with consumer’s price sensitivity under
three pricing policies. Counterfactual results are shown in Figure 3a. Our first observation is
that, as consumers become less tolerant to a rise in price (i.e., α becomes larger), consumer
surplus decreases under any pricing. This occurs because a high α decreases the number of
matches. As discussed earlier, consumers with lower α are more flexible to choose between
high price and longer wait. Thus, our findings indicate that consumers benefit more from
dynamic pricing policies with their flexibility. However, the rate of decrease diminishes. Con-
sumers’ willingness-to-pay is
θi,t
α
+ 1, which is inversely related with α. Price is also inversely
related with α. These relationships diminish the rate of decrease with α. This suggests
that the marginal effect of adding tolerance is salient for more price-sensitive consumers.
Furthermore, by comparing policies, we find that consumers are worse off with Case 1 than
with the other two policies. Price smoothing enables more consumers to be served by their
strategic behavior such as delaying the ride until price drops. However, with too high price
sensitivity, the difference diminishes. We also observe that the difference between Case 2 and
Case 3 is minimal, which indicates that consumers do not benefit from efficiency generated
by adopting anticipated capacity spillovers. This is intuitive because consumers benefit from
their transactions no matter how many drivers are nearby, as long as their demand is served.
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<Insert Figure 3 about here>
We next illustrate the amount of labor surplus generated under various pricing policies.
Our results are presented in Figure 3b. Overall, drivers benefit from surge pricing policies
when consumers have low price sensitivity. Since price inversely relates to α (si,t ∝ α),
the expected earnings decrease with α. Despite the negative impact of individual driver’s
expected earning, the total number of drivers in the focal zone has a positive impact on
labor surplus. In fact, the price sensitivities of participation from NC and UC in the focal
zone positively relate with α (i.e. γNC = −β2 · 2αγFC , γUC = −β3 · 2αγFC and β2, β3 < 0).
As α increases, FC increases at an increasing rate at a certain price. This diminishes the
decreasing rate of labor surplus. However, once α exceeds a certain point, price becomes one
(i.e., no congestion in the zone), which decreases the driver’s probability of serving. This, in
turn, induces a high rate of decrease. The three factors described previously when combined
set up a point of inflection for labor surplus; each pricing policy has a distinct level of α
at which each curve forms its point of inflection. While the point of inflection under Case
1 is formed when α is about 20, the inflection point appears when α is about 40 under
Cases 2 and 3. The different positions indicate that price smoothing (
∑N
j=1wijsj,t) dilutes
the effects of α on labor surplus. That is, by letting the focal price depend on neighboring
prices, drivers’ benefits become less sensitive to α. This suggests that, in general, drivers
benefit more with less shortage achieved by price smoothing. Nonetheless, unlike consumers,
drivers may benefit from both effectiveness and efficiency, since driver’s expected earnings
may decrease as utilization decreases. Drivers, counterintuitively, are strictly better off with
Case 3 that yields higher average utilization than Case 2. The gap is more salient when α
is greater than the point of inflection. The counterintuitive phenomenon is explained by the
information that price contains. Price is the only information that determines the probability
of drivers acquiring riders without utilization level information. When price becomes as low
as one, it provides no utilization information. Therefore, in higher alpha ranges that make
price become one, the driver’s expected earning reacts only to shortage but not to utilization
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as long as demand is present.
To summarize, and building on the conventional literature (i.e., analytical treatment
based on spot pricing, termed as Case 1 in our analyses), both price and capacity spillovers
have a direct effect on surpluses. In particular, (i) consumers benefit from the increase of
possible matches achieved via price smoothing and (ii) drivers benefit only from effectiveness,
regardless of efficiency, when the information that price provides is limited.
DISCUSSION AND EXTENSIONS
Spillovers Matter
Ride-sharing platforms manage their pricing policies to orchestrate spatially distributed ca-
pacity in serving demand. In this paper, by addressing the spatial dimension, we help fill a
gap in empirical revenue management literature where most studies rely on the competing
results from spot pricing and ignore capacity spillovers. With a spatial econometric spec-
ification, we estimate the extent to which spillovers are associated with price and analyze
surpluses under different pricing policies. Our analyses provide a variety of insights for de-
signing and managing service platforms. We show that a surge pricing strategy that utilizes
price smoothing helps reduce average capacity shortage compared to a spot surge pricing
strategy. Through price smoothing, platforms can effectively maintain adequate, spatially
distributed capacity. Moreover, such high service rates enable the platform to benefit both
consumers (riders) and drivers by increasing the ecosystem in the long-run. In other words,
consumer benefits can spread to ride-share drivers (Parker and Van Alstyne 2005). In addi-
tion to the long-run positive network effect, drivers benefit from the lower shortage achieved
in the short-run, even when drivers have limited access to the utilization information. Our
analysis shows that although a strategy that incorporates the anticipated capacity spillovers
(Case 2) generates higher average capacity utilization than the strategy without anticipated
capacity spillovers (Case 3), drivers fare better in Case 3. This has important implications
for platform designers. By limiting the provision of utilization information to drivers, a
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platform can achieve risk-less growth with a spatial surge pricing strategy.
Updating Speed Matters
We have shown that the impact of spatial pricing strategies varies with consumer’s price
sensitivity. Ride-sharing platforms digitize all transactions, which helps the firm to quickly
determine demand and capacity. In our data set, Uber adjusts its price as quickly as 5
seconds based on the data regarding demand and capacity data. Our counterfactual analysis
indicates the impact of high-frequency data in pricing strategies. Uber currently follows
Case 2 as their pricing strategy. Case 3 uses a more aggressive pricing strategy and always
outperforms Case 2 in all price elasticity conditions (see Figures 3a and 3b). Moreover, it is
clear that Case 2’s performance nears that of Case 3’s performance, and that Cases 2 and 3
outperform Case 1 (spot pricing). Arguably, an explanation for this closeness between Cases
2 and 3 is that the algorithm is updating the state variables (e.g., capacity in neighbouring
zones) and customer demand every few seconds. Even though Case 2 is not aggressive
enough, Uber’s algorithm can catch up and come close to the aggressive performance (i.e.,
Case 3) well before the drivers and consumers can update their own decision. Typically,
drivers take minutes to update their decision to participate based on Uber’s algorithm, and
this process is an order of magnitude slower than the algorithm. Our results show key
parameters for further tuning the algorithms are α, θ, and the γs.
Limitations and Future Work
Some of the key results are driven by our assumptions. First, we assume that a driver es-
timates expected earnings based only on the price information. In practice, however, each
driver also learns from their previous experiences in estimating the probability of partici-
pating. Thus, the results on labor surplus may change with the driver’s learning about the
relationship between pricing and demand. Such learning could help incorporate efficiency
into the long-run labor surplus. Second, we analyze performance under the assumption that
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no alternatives exist for both consumers and drivers. However, in ride-sharing scenarios
where drivers and consumers can easily switch to another platform, it is important to con-
sider how efficiently a match is made since efficiency matters in the long-term participation
decision of both drivers and consumers. Although competition among platforms for drivers
is beyond the scope for this paper, future work should consider how competition can best
be analyzed when determining the optimal pricing policy.
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Table 1: Empirical Studies on Demand and Capacity Management
Static Demand
(exogenous to price change)
Dynamic Demand
(endogenous to price change)
Static (exogenous) Capacity
Olivares and Cachon (2009)
Li et al. (2016)
Cui and Hu (2018)
Lu et al. (2013)
Li et al. (2014)
Tereyag˘og˘lu et al. (2018)
Dynamic (endogenous) Capacity
Moreno and Terwiesch (2015)
Karacaoglu et al. (2017)
Our paper
Table 2: Variable Descriptions
Variable Description
si,t Average surge multiplier in zone i for period t
FCi,t Focal capacity - Number of drivers in zone i for period t
NCi,t Neighbor capacity - Number of drivers in the neighbors of zone i for period t
UCt Untapped capacity - Number of non-operating registered drivers for period t
di,t Aggregate demand - Number of ride requests in zone i for period t
bji Proportion of ride requests that transit from zone j to zone i
γl Aggregate price sensitivity of capacity type l (l ∈ {FC,NC,UC})
δl Static portion of capacity type l’s participation (l ∈ {FC,NC,UC})
Pl Capacity type l’s participation probability (l ∈ {FC,NC,UC})
α Aggregate price sensitivity of demand
θi,t Exogenous demand states (i.e., levels) in zone i for period t
α/θi,t Price elasticity
p Penalty costs for capacity shortage
h Holding costs for excess capacity
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Table 3: Relationship between capacity levels and surge multiplier
Surge Multiplier (si,t)
FCi,t 1.22× 10−5 -
(4.99× 10−5) -
FCi,t−1 - 3.23× 10−5
- (5.16× 10−5)
NCi,t −4.96× 10−4** -
(1.03× 10−4) -
NCi,t−1 - −4.52× 10−4**
- (1.08× 10−4)
UCt −1.89× 10−6* -
(7.31× 10−7) -
UCt−1 - −1.61× 10−6*
- (7.40× 10−7)∑N
j=1 wijsj,t 0.89** 0.89**
(0.013) (0.013)
Controls included included
Log-likelihood 75369.06 75295.48
Notes. Controls include Hourt, Weekendt, and Weathert . Robust standard errors clustered by zone are in parentheses.
Number of observation is 156692 for the main model and 156520 for the lagged model.
+p < 0.1; ∗p < 0.05; ∗ ∗ p < 0.01.
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework
Notes. wij is a weight of zone j based on spatial proximity between zone i and zone j
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(a) Average Capacity Shortage (Less is Better) (b) Average Utilization (More is Better)
Figure 2: Efficiency and Effectiveness in Reducing Congestion
(a) Consumer Surplus (b) Labor Surplus
Figure 3: Consumer and Labor Surplus
Appendix A Proof of Equilibrium Price
The surge multiplier does not decrease below 1 even in case of low utilization, but only
increases up to smax in the case of congestion (1 ≥ si,t ≥ smax). Therefore, we are only
interested in the equilibrium when the demand state is greater than or equal to the current
focal capacity (i.e. E[di,t | si,t = 1] ≥ FCi,t). Hence, we can simplify the cost function
Vi,t(FCi,t) as follows:
Vi,t(FCi,t) = E[p ·max(0, di,t − FCi,t) + h · FCi,t+1] = p · (E[di,t]− FCi,t) + h · E[FCi,t+1]
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Then, the first order condition (FOC) is:
∂Vi,t(FCi,t)
∂si,t
= p · ∂E[di,t]
∂si,t
+ h · ∂FCi,t+1
∂si,t
= 0
(i) If the endogenous demand is still greater than the focal capacity with any price s∗i,t
(i.e. di,t(s
∗
i,t) ≥ FCi,t), then s∗i,t = smax
(ii) However, if the demand becomes lower than the focal capacity with a certain price
s∗i,t (i.e. di,t(s
∗
i,t) < FCi,t), then the FOC is:
−pα + h((FCi,t + α · s∗i,t − θi,t) · γFC + α(γFC · s∗i,t + δFC) +NCi,t · γNC + UCt · γUC) = 0
s∗i,t =
−pα + hαδFC − hθi,tγFC + hγFCFCi,t + hγNCNCi,t + hγUCUCt
−2hαγFC
=
p− hδFC
2hγFC
− 1
2α
FCi,t − γNC
2αγFC
NCi,t − γUC
2αγFC
UCt +
θi,t
2α

Appendix B Description of Data
Figure B.1: Travel Time from One Zone to Another Zone
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Figure B.2: Example of Trend of Total Drivers
Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics
Summary Statistics Correlation
Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev si,t FCi,t NCi,t UCt
si,t 1.0000 3.3702 1.0467 0.1458 1 -0.08 -0.13 0.21
FCi,t 0.00 615.00 30.74 41.41 1 0.65 -0.37
NCi,t 0.00 155.00 31.63 25.24 1 -0.64
UCt 0.00 12714.00 7426.02 2660.31 1
Appendix C Robustness Checks
Table C.1: Robustness Check with Different Time-intervals
Dependent Variable: Surge Multiplier
15-minute Interval 60-minute Interval
(N = 313,212) (N = 78,432)
Spatial Dependency 0.90** 0.87**
(0.012) (0.015)
Focal Capacity 6.52× 10−6 2.82× 10−5
(8.32× 10−5) (3.05× 10−5)
Neighbor Capacity −8.80× 10−4** −3.10× 10−4**
(1.82× 10−4) (1.41× 10−4 )
Untapped Capacity −3.49× 10−6** −1.18× 10−6**
(1.35× 10−6) (4.08× 10−7 )
Controls included included
Log-likelihood 144053.10 38599.65
Notes. Controls include Hourt, Weekendt, and Weathert . Robust standard errors clustered by zone are in parentheses.
+p < 0.1; ∗p < 0.05; ∗ ∗ p < 0.01.
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Table C.2: Robustness Check with Different W s
Dependent Variable: Surge Multiplier
W1 W2 W3
(N = 156,692) (N = 156,692) (N = 156,692)
FE RE FE RE FE RE
Spatial Dependency 0.89** 0.89** 0.85** 0.85** 0.87** 0.87**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Focal Capacity 1.22× 10−5 1.06× 10−5 8.27× 10−5 8.39× 10−5 1.11× 10−4 + 1.10× 10−4 +
(4.99× 10−5) (4.82× 10−5) (5.32× 10−5 ) (5.15× 10−5 ) (5.68× 10−5 ) (5.52× 10−5 )
Neighbor Capacity −4.96× 10−4** −4.72× 10−4** −3.85× 10−4** −3.76× 10−4** −6.84× 10−4** −6.65× 10−4**
(1.03× 10−4) (1.00× 10−4 ) (7.41× 10−5 ) (7.18× 10−5 ) (1.08× 10−4 ) (1.04× 10−4 )
Untapped Capacity −1.89× 10−6* −1.75× 10−6* −4.90× 10−7 −4.30× 10−7 −2.42× 10−6** −2.31× 10−6**
(7.31× 10−7) (7.18× 10−7 ) (6.16× 10−7 ) (6.07× 10−7 ) (7.32× 10−7 ) (7.16× 10−7 )
Controls included included included included included included
Log-likelihood 75369.06 74919.32 77648.74 77199.68 75132.59 74678.40
Notes. Controls include Hourt, Weekendt, and Weathert . Robust standard errors clustered by zone are in parentheses.
FE: Fixed Effects, RE: Random Effects
+p < 0.1; ∗p < 0.05; ∗ ∗ p < 0.01.
Table C.3: Robustness Check with IVs (GMM approach with FCi,t−8 as IV)
Dependent Variable: Surge Multiplier
30-minute Interval
(N = 156,692)
Spatial Dependency 1.03**
(0.026)
Focal Capacity −2.14× 10−5**
(3.05× 10−5)
Neighbor Capacity −7.22× 10−5**
(1.36× 10−5 )
Untapped Capacity −3.67× 10−7**
(3.29× 10−8 )
Controls included
Notes. Controls include Hourt, Weekendt, and Weathert . Robust standard errors clustered by zone are in parentheses.
+p < 0.1; ∗p < 0.05; ∗ ∗ p < 0.01.
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Appendix D Demand Sensitivity (Aggregate price sensitivity of de-
mand α set at 50)
(a) Average Capacity Shortage (Less is Better) (b) Average Utilization (More is Better)
Figure D.1: Demand Sensitivity for Congestion
(a) Consumer Surplus (b) Labor Surplus
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